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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
For forty centuries, small - scale peasant farming to supply active 
locAl markets t ypified the agricultural sector in China . But, since the 
revolution i n 1949, the Chinese have experimented with various-- and 
sometimes conflicting--strategies for improving agricultural product i on 
and accelerating development of the agricultural sector . 
In the ea rly 1950s , the communists carried out a program of land 
r eform that r edistributed almost half of China's cultivated area to poor 
and l andless farmers . This was short lived, howeve r, because Mao and his 
followers bel ieved continued reliance on private farming would encourage 
capitalist values and behavior. So, farmers were organized into 
collectives durjng the mid-1950s because "collectivized agriculture would 
mobilize the peasants and 'unleash' the productive powers of socialist 
agricul ture" (Barker and Sinha, 1982 , page 71) . 
The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), during which all of China's 
fa r mers were reorganized into large - scale communes in order to achieve 
ambitious grain production targets, carried this idea to excess. 
Although the commune movement ended with a serious agricultura l c risis in 
1959, the commune structure itsel f was retained and limited decision-
making authority was t r ansferred to the smaller production team . 
From the onset of the Cultural Revolution (mid-1960s) to the death 
of Mao ( 1976), the l ef t wing of China's communist party s uccessfully 
stif l e d right-wing efforts to decentralize decision making and institute 
mate r ial incentives . But, after Mao's death, the communis t right wing 
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seized the opportunity to implement its pol icies, replacing the "Gang of 
Four" with the "Four Modernizations." A journal article entitled, 
"Harshly Criticize the Left; Then We Can Have Speedy Agricultural 
Development" (Chang and Huang, 1979), reflects the mood at that time. 
From 197 8 to the present, Chinese agricultural policy has been 
domina ted by the Production Responsibility Sys tem, wherein greater 
freedom from state control is accomplished by p;ranting wider decision-
making authority to groups , households , and even individuals within 
traditional production teams (Tuan and Crook , 1983). Thus, the cur r ent 
situation is much different from the Cultural Revolution or the Great 
Leap Forward . Agriculture is still collectivized under the commune 
system and the state still acquires its desired quantities of output 
through agricultural taxes and imposition of quotas for sale to procure-
ment agencies . Production teams--composed of 30 to 40 households--remain 
the basic unit of account . Under the Responsibility System, however, 
teams encourap;e households to cultivate private plots, market their 
output in rural trade fair s , and even subcontract a share of the team's 
quota obligations to the state . 
The past ten years suggest that agriculture in China may become even 
more market oriented . However, events since 1949 also warn that any such 
trend may be s ubject to sharp reversal. Because the recent history of 
Chinese agricultural policy has been characterized by shifts from left to 
right, the results have been mixed. 1 Out of this experience , the 
1There is an abundance of literature regarding this issue. See, 
for example, Barker and Sinha (1982) , Hsu (1982), and Lardy (1983). 
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Chinese have perceived a need for more effective agricultural planning 
and policy making . 
Through special access to a set of 1980 records for an agricultural 
collective ( production team) located in north China plain , I have applied 
an analytical technique that goes some distance in meeting this need. 
The r esearch here, presented in two essays, uses linear programming to 
exami ne the optimal economic behavior of a typical production team under 
different economic policy envi ronme nts. 
Organization of the Thesis 
This research i s organized as follows. Part One, "The Optimal 
Response of a Chinese Agricultural Collective to Alternative Economic 
Policy Environments, " compar es the team's optimal economic behavior in 
five distinct policy environments. The coverage of the theoretical back-
gr ound and testing of the model is applicable to the analysis in both 
essays . Therefore, the sections of Part One describing the theoretical 
framework a nd testing of the model are presented in greater detail than 
in Part Two and the reader of Part Two may refer to this initial 
cover age . 
Part Two presents the second essay, "The Effect of Shifting 
Market Structures on a Chinese Collective's Output Supply and Input 
Demand, " where we use the methodology developed in Part One, then 
introduce parametric programming to compare market supply and demand 
rela t ionships in three different policy periods . 
Each essay contains its own conclusion and overall conclusions from 
the research are briefly summarized following Part Two . 
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PART ONE 
THE OPTIMAL RESPONSE OF A CHINESE AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVE 
TO ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY ENVIRONMENTS 
5 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1949, leaders of mainland China have experimented with 
seemingly contradictory strategies for improving agricultural production 
and accelerating development of t he agri.cultural sector. Out of this 
e xpe rience, the Chinese have perceived a need for more effective agricul-
tural planning and policy making . Because the agricultural production 
team is a critical link in China' s planning process and because it 
provides a consistent unit of account, the production team is a logical 
place t o begin evaluating this need. 
For instance, if a set of records for an actual team was available , 
it would be possible to investigate the response of the team to the 
different economic objectives c reated by different agricultural policy 
environments. Such a study would be of special interest to Chinese 
planners in at least two r espects. First, the study would indicate how a 
typical production team might behave in different policy environments. 
Planners could then use that information to be more effective in setting 
targets for agricultural production (or income) and in formulating 
policies conducive to meeting those targets efficiently . Second, for the 
benefi t of the indiv i dual team, the study would provide a fresh empi r ical 
perspect ive, putting the team ..... in a far better position to resist 
inappropriate suggestions from higher levels" (Stavis, 1979, p. 50). 
Through special access to a set of 1980 records for a production 
t eam located in the north China plain, I was able to perform such an 
analysis. Specifically, in this paper I construct a linear programming 
6 
model of the team and then compare the team's optimal response to five 
distinc t policy e nvironments as represented by five economic objective 
functions (and associated modifications of the constraint set). My 
objective is to determine the microeconomic impact of the five policy 
environments on the team's 1) resource allocation, 2) production, and 
3) i ncome . From these three indices were drawn hypotheses 2 through 4 
below. 
In terms of the overall analysis, T. w. Schultz argues t hat "farmers 
are not perver se economic men in responding to economic incentives, 
whether one observes them in China • •• or the U.S. " (Schultz, 1965, p . 31). 
He further notes: "Although the refrain that farmers in poor countries 
do not respond to economic incentives is still very popular, it is being 
interrupted by strong evidence to the contrary" (Schultz, 1965, p . 31) . 
Fr om these assertions we formulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1--The economic behavior of the production team is 
rational and, therefo re, amenable to microeconomic analysis. 
Nonrejection of this hypothesis would set the stage for evaluating the 
remaining three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2 (resource allocation)--Because land is a scarce factor 
in Chinese agriculture , all land will be cultivated, regardless of 
changing economic objectives. 
Hypo~hesis 3 (production)--Collective foodgrain production will be 
sacrificed in favor of other commodities as the agricultural economy 
becomes more market oriented, revealing the team ' s comparative 
advantage . 
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Hypothesis 4 (income)--The team's total income will increase as the 
agricultural economy becomes more market oriented . 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a part of the larger Chinese economy, the production team must 
optimize a n objective function base d upon the socialist labor theory of 
value (Lardy, 1978) which provides us with the identity: 
P C+V+M 
where P value or price, 
C = embodied ( or past) labor, 
V present labor, and 
M Marxian surplus value. 
For the Chinese agricultural economy , this relationship may be furt her 
disaggregated: 
where p = price, 
c = nonlabor production costs, 
vk = in-kind wages to labor, 
v "" cash wages to labor, c 
Mf collective fund, and 
Mt taxes. 
This relationship may also be illustrated with a diagram, as in 
Figure l. 
From the socialist labor theory of value can be formulated a set of 
expressions which represent four periods of policy objectives imposed 
PRODUCTION x PRICE 
PLAN 
ABOVE PLAN 
MARKET 
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Figure 1. Origin and components of income for 
socialist planning models 
upon the production team at various times in post - 1949 China . To these 
may be added a fifth hypothesized case of a marke t economy . Concep-
tually , these five cases lie along an ideological continuum (Figure 2). 
At the left end of this continuum, we find an environment of 
centralized economic control which reflects the situation during the 
Great Leap Forward. At the other end is the decentralized environment of 
1 
a market economy, similar to the present situation in Taiwan province . 
1The period from 1949 to 1958 has been excluded because production 
teams did not exist for most of that time. Likewise, the Cultural 
Revolution has been excluded because the objective function is unknown. 
Centralized 
contr ol 
Great Leap 
Forward 
( 1958-1960) 
Five-Year 
Adjustment 
( 1961-1966) 
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Four Responsibility 
Modern i zations System 
(1978) (1981) 
Dece ntralized 
control 
Market 
Economy 
(hypothetical) 
Figure 2 . Continuum of the degree of centralized control 
in the Chinese agricultural economy 
By solving modified versions of a linear programming problem which 
simulates the team's actual behavior in 1980, we can examine the optimal 
behavior of the team at the five points highlighted along this 
continuum . 1 
Case 1: The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) 
Case l depicts the production team in an environment where there is 
state control of productive assets and highly centralized economic 
planning and decision making. Such was the state of affairs in China 
during the Great Leap Forward, when 
Collectives were not free to alloca t e resources in such a way 
as to maximize net income . For example, they could not 
allocate l and between alternative crops according to relative 
costs and r eturns . Allocation, instead , was determined 
theoretically by the state plan, which was not drawn up with 
the s pecific purpose of providing collectives with maximum 
income (Walker, 1968, p. 426) . 
1rt is cri t ical to understand that these linear programs compare 
the t eam' s behavior over a series of objective functions, and not over 
time . In fact , the LP models for all five cases were solved using 
constant 1980 prices and t echnol ogy. 
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Our t eam was directed to g r ow wheat, corn, and cotton, exclusively, and 
produc tion targets were high. Specifically, the team had to grow enough 
of each crop to meet l) government quotas and 2) their own subsistence 
needs. Beyonrl this, household plot produc tion was st rictly forbidden . 
During the Great Leap Forward, the actual physical production of 
grain was considered the overriding criterion of success, and resources 
were allocated to achieve this aim "regardless of cost, either direct or 
indirecet" (Walker, 1968, p . 427). In other words, the production team's 
primary objective was to maximize physical output, cost considerations 
aside . Graphically, the LP problem is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Wheat 
I- - -
Cotton 
Figure 3 . Output maximization 
land, labor, and capital (less than constraints); 
subsistence output levels (greater than or equal to 
constraint); 
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X government procurement quotas (greater than or equal 
q 
to constraint); and 
Q Q - quantities of corn and wheat. c ' w -
In economic terms, t he maximand is not income, but output , and the 
objective function becomes a ratio not of prices, but of quantities. 
Output is weighted equally in catties, 1 which is unfair to cotton, but 
we must keep in mind that "the actual physical production of grain was 
the overriding criterion of success" (Walker, 1968, p. 427) during the 
Great Leap Forward. Thus, in case 1, the LP model is used to maximize 
the objective functio n: 
where ~ =net output of all crops, 
Qi total output of crop i, 
Mf collective fund (in-kind), 
M =taxes (in-kind), and the solution would be analogous to 
t 
point A in Figure 3. 
It is significant that costs (C) and labor income (Vk +Ve) do not appear 
in this function . As we have seen , these factors were not considerations 
in the policies of the Great Leap Forward and, therefore, should not be 
included in the maximization problem. 
1In China, the standard measure of agricultural output is a 
catty--a measure of weight equivalent to 0.5 kilograms or 1.1 pounds. 
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Case 2 : The Five - Year Adj ustment (1961 -1 966) 
Case 2 r e presents the economic environment faced by the production 
team f r om 1961 to 1966 . As during the Grea t Leap Forward , the central 
gove rnment dictated to the team that it must produce cer t ain crops, sell 
mi nimum quo tas to the government at procurement prices, and meet its own 
subsi s t ence needs . But, unlike the Great Leap Forward , up t o five 
percent of cul t ivated land could be allocated to household plots and 
importance was attAc hed to improving team prosperity (Hsu , 1982) . 
Indeed, policies of this period allowed the team to focus upon income 
rather than output. 
Gr a phically , the LP problem can be illustrated in much the same way 
it was f or cas e 1, with an important exception : The objective f unction 
in Fig ure 3 would become a ratio of prices because the maximand is income 
and no t ou t put . Algebraical l y , the function maximized in case 2 is : 
where V = cash i ncome to labo r, c 
Pi Qi = t o tal r evenue, 
C.X. z produc t ion costs , 
J J 
Mf collective fund, 
Mt taxes, and all other terms are the same as in case 1. 
14 
Case 3: The Four Moderni zations (1978) 
Case 3 corresponds to the economic environment at the onset of the 
Four Modernizations, when policies shifted significantly rightward along 
the continuum in Figure 3 . Teams were granted broader rights of self-
management, and economic decision making moved toward decentralization . 
Although procurement quotas (X ) remained in force, the team was 
q 
free to either producP or purchase commodities to fulfill its subsistence 
r equirement (X ) . Additionally, household plot allowances were expanded 
s 
to 15 percent of total cultivated area. Policies at this time also 
eliminated the collective fund (Mf) and permitted labor hiring during 
periods of peak labor demand . 
I n this new environment, the team ' s interest in improving its 
ove rall profit picture became especially strong (Tuan and Crook , 1983). 
Assuming profit (i . e ., income) maximizing behavior by the team, the 
o bjective function becomes: 
Case 4: The Responsibility System (1981-Present) 
Case 4 considers the behavior of the production team under the 
Responsibility System . Broadly speaking, the Responsibility System 
allows brigades to contract with member households or groups of house-
holds for fulfillment of production quotas and/or specific labor tasks. 
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So long as contract obligations are met, the team is free to engage in 
household plot production. 
Because the team is the basic unit of account used throughout this 
analysis , we have chosen to represent a form of the Responsibility System 
known as "group contracts" ( lian chan dao zu) • 1 Under this 
arrangement, the collective divides its fields into strips and contracts 
to meet fixed quotas. In effect, this means the only area r es triction on 
househo l d plot production would be the area set aside for contracted cr op 
production. 
Other policies of this period, such as elimination of the collective 
fund and labor hiring , are similar to those in case 3. Since the team is 
again acting to maximize profits/income , the form of the objective 
function is duplicated from case 3 and only the constraint set is 
modified. 
Case 5: Market Economy (Hypothetical) 
Case 5 postulates the introduction of a market economy into the 
present-day agricultural organization in China. In fact, this case might 
be compared with cooperative forms of agricultural organization practiced 
in Taiwan. 
In this case, all quota restrictions (X ) a re removed . Moreover, 
q 
the team may allocate its land freely between household and collective 
production. And, although the s ubsis tence requirements (X ) for wheat, 
s 
1the actual form of Responsibility System followed by this team is 
not known. 
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corn, and cotton are retained, the team may choose either to produce 
these commodities itself or purchase them in local markets . Labor hiring 
is, of co urse , permitted. 
To reflect the team's new market- type environment, the objective 
function becomes: 
v 
c 
and t he constraint set is adjusted accordingly. A summary of the 
distinctions between the five cases is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Key distinctions between the LP models for cases 1 through 5 
Quotas/ Subsistence 
con tracts requirement Labor hiring Plot area 
Case 1 Quotas Produce 0 0 
Case 2 Quotas Produce 0 5% maximum 
Produce or 
Case 3 Quotas buy 3 people 10% maximum 
Produce or 
Case 4 Contracts buy 6 people 15% maximum 
Produce or 
Case 5 0 buy Unconstrained 100% maximum 
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THE MODEL 
A generalized vers ion of the LP matrices used to s imulate the team's 
actual economic behavior in 1980, as well as to solve the maximization 
problems in cases 1 through 5, is illustrated in Figure 4. 1 The 
practical attrac tions of this model are best highlighted with a couple of 
examples. In case 1, for instance , only the quantitative objective 
funct ion (C row) was maximize d. Within the matrix itself, the buying, 
borrowing , hiring , and private plo t activities were dropped; corre-
spondingly, the r ight-hand sides (RHS) for hiring and plots were set 
equal to zero. 
In case 5, on the other hand, the economic objective function (C 
row) was maximized and only the collective fund activity was dropped. To 
eliminate production quotas/contracts, the associated restriction (RHS) 
was set equal to zero. Fur thermor e , to a ct iva te the plot activity, the 
RHS was set less t han or equal to 20, allowing the plot area of 14.34 mou 
to come in up t o 20 times. 2 
The plot activity also includes a special provision with regard to 
labor. For each five percent (14 .34 mou) of land area allocated to 
private plots, five percent of the collective's labor supply is 
1Because no comparable time series of c ross-sectional data are 
available, we were not able to estimate production functions. By 
implication, the team is limited to producing with a single technology. 
2The total collective land area is 20 x 14.34 mou = 286.8 mou. In 
case 2, where up to five percent of collective land may be allocated to 
private plots, the plot activity is allowed to come in up to one time for 
a maximum of 14 . 34 mou . 
Produce Sell Buy Consume Taxes Fund Borrow Hire Plots RRS 
c row (economic) -cj cJ -cj -cj -cj -cj -c. J cJ 
c row (quantitative) Qj -Qj -1 -Qj -1 n . a . n . a. n .a . 
Land 1 1 Bi 
Labor aij -1 aij Bi 
Bullocks aij Bi 
Capital a .. 
1] 
-1 a .. 
1] 
a .. 
1] Bi 
Ouotas/contracts 1 Bi 
Subsistence 1 1 Bi 
Transfer rows 1 1 0 --aij CX> 
Collective accounting -aij aij - aij -aij -1 -aij aij 0 
Taxes 1 Bi 
Hiring 1 aij Bi 
Plot transfer 1 Bi 
Figure 4 . Generalized programming model for a north China production team 
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redistributed to the plot activity. Also, because the labore rs' 
incentive to work ts heightened significantly by the opportunity to 
engage in private plot produc tion, 1 additional labor reso urces, 
amounting to ten percent of the original collective labor supply, are 
made available for each five percent of land area that goes into private 
plot production . Thus, if 770 labor unit hours are available in a 
typic al ten-day period, 2 anrl if five percent o f land area is allocated 
to private plots, then l) 38 labor unit hours are redirec ted from the 
collective to the plots and 2) another 77 labor unit hours are added to 
the labor resources available for plot production to reflect the 
heighte ned incentive to work. 3 
As demonstrated with these examples, the model is designed so that a 
few simple manipulations allow us to represent any nlDilber of policy 
environments--including the five cases considered here. 
1see for example Burki (1969), ~sher (1983) , and Walker (1968). 
2consistent with the practice in China, this study has 
disaggregated labor into ten-day periods, or xun. For example, one month 
has three xun. 
3Because the estimation of a labor supply curve lies beyond the 
scope of this analysis, labor has been treated as a stock, leaving issues 
of labor supply to be examined in other studies. 
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RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: Rational Economic Behavior 
This hypothesis lays the foundation for the res t of the analysis . 
We incorporated actual 1980 data into the generalized model shown in 
Figure 4, making the modifications necessary to reflect the economic 
policy environment faced by the team in that year. In terms of the 
matrix , the collective fund was eliminated; contr-ac t obligations were set 
at 27,700 for co rn, 16 , 620 catties for wheat, and 2,800 catties for 
cotton. The plot tr ansfer row was se t less than or equal to three, 
meaning that up to 15 percent of collective land area could be used for 
private plots. 
We then conducted a simulation run, forcing the team to act as it 
had in 1980 when it cultivated 213.1 mou of corn, 173.1 mou of wheat , and 
59.4 mou of cotton . The purpose of the simulation was to check the LP 
matrix for internal consistency and to estimate the level of available 
production capital. Having done this, we were in a position to test our 
first hypothesis . 
If the LP solution could predict the team's ac tual behavior in 1980 
without being forced, we would be able to accept the LP model as a valid 
analytical technique. If not, we would have evidence that the economic 
be havior of the team is not rational and microeconomic analysis would be 
meaningless . The results of this test are presented i n Table 2. 
Because the model accurately predicted the response of the produc-
tion t eam to the economic environment in 1980, we were able t o accept our 
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Table 2 . A comparison of actual and predicted team behavior for 1980 
Land utilization (mou): 
Early 
Late 
Output levels (c~tties): 
Wheat 
Corn 
Cotton 
Net t e am income (yuan) 
Actual 
232 . S 
272.S 
74, 03 1 
111,00 1 
3,263 
¥22,471 
Predicted 
232 
272 
73,860 
110,712 
3,277 
¥1 8 , 233 
first hypothesis . The economic behavior of the t eam is rational and, 
therefore, amenable t o microeconomic analysis through linear programming. 
To paraphrase Schultz , these farmers are not perverse economic men (and 
women) in responding t o economic incentives . 
We are now in a position to evaluate our remaining hypotheses by 
comparing the results of the LP runs for cases l through 5 . These 
results are summarized in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 2 : Maximum Land Cultivation 
Because Chinese agriculture has developed under conditions of land 
constraints, and because "nearly all land that can possibly be cultivated 
is farmed if it can be of any net benefit" (Barker and Sinha, 1982), we 
would expect the team to cultivate all of its land regardless of the 
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Table 3 . A summary of LP result s for cases l through 5 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
In-kind income: 
Quantity 49 ,069 
Value 4,941 
Cash income 8,470 17 , 7 66 22,169 28,064 
Collective income 4,941 2,91 0 5,666 0 0 
Household income 0 5,560 12,100 22, 169 28,064 
Total income 4,941 8,470 17,766 22 , 169 28,064 
Net subsistence value 14 ,47 5 14,475 8,410 8,410 8,410 
Adjusted t otal 19,736 23,265 26, 17 6 30,579 36,474 
Output levels: 
Wheat 74,294 74,294 74,294 62,257 64,255 
Corn 111,332 109,216 95, 967 7 5 ,785 78,217 
Total food grain 185,626 183,510 170,261 138 ,042 142,472 
Cotton 3 ,277 3 ,277 3 ,277 2 , 800 2,304 
Vegetables (mou) 0 12 27 65 68 
Pigs (head) 0 27 164 252 261 
Land utilization ( 286. 8 available): 
Early collective 233 233 233 196 192 
Late collective 273 269 244 196 192 
Household plots 0 14 43 90 95 
policy or economic envit"onment . Our r esults , however, have demonstrated 
something to the contrary, forcing us to r eject our second hypothesis. 
The figures in Table 4 indicate the team does not fully utilize all 
286.8 mou of its land in cases 1 and 2 . This occurs because the team 
faces a labor constraint in these two cases, which is relieved in cases 3 
through 5 when labor hiring is permitted . Similarly, there are 
particulat" ten-day periods when l abor demand peaks and the team 
23 
Table 4 . Percentage of total land cultivated in cases 1 through 5 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
-------------------- Percent------ --------------
Land cultivated 
Early 
Late 
81 
95 
86 
98 
96 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
experiences a labor sho rtage. During the rest of the season, there is 
significant surplus labor. 
For the team to efficiently utilize all its land, it needs to 
acquire additional labor for the first 20 days of June (when it plants 
corn, ha rvests wheat, and irrigates cotton) and for the first ten days of 
October (when it plants wheat, harvests corn, and harvests cotton) . The 
value of each additional unit of labor in these periods is reflected by 
its shadow price . The figures in Table 5, which are specific for 
collective labor in the first ten days of October, provide an illustra-
tion . 
Table S. Shadow prices for collective labor in early October 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Collective labor 
hired (hours)a 0 0 91 96 150 
Shadow price per 
labor hour n .a. 17 .39 .865 .899 12 . 62 
aOne hundred labor hours are equivalent to one labor unit working 
ten hours per day for t en days . 
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In case 2, where labor hiring is not permitted, the val ue of an 
arlditional hour of labor is ¥37.39, well above the going wage of 
¥0 . 865/hour. In cases 3 and 4, however, labor is hired up to the point 
where the wage paid to labor (price ) equals the value of the marRinal 
product (shadow price) . In other words, policies which allow the team to 
hire labor also allow the team to operate efficiently. Thus, once the 
ban on hiring is lif ted, peak period labor shortages are resolved, labor 
is employed efficiently, and the team uses 100 percent of its land, as 
shown in Table 4 . 
Hypothesis 3: Declining Foodgrain Production 
There are several reasons for expecting foodgrain production to 
decline as the economic environment becomes more market oriented. First, 
we know that combined quota and subsistence levels have traditionally 
been quite high. Even in 1980, the team fell short of foodgrain produc-
tion targets. So, as the quota restrictions are lifted, we would expect 
to see corn and wheat production fall . 
Second, Chinese planners have long regarded increased foodgrain 
production and local self-sufficiency as central objectives for the 
agricultural economy and the output quotas have been formulated 
accordingly. Out of this, it sometimes happened that "local knowledge of 
cropping patterns, soil fertility, and climate were overlooked and teams 
were forced to grow crops not suited for their area" (Tuan and Crook, 
1983, p. 40) . As various restrictions upon output are lifted from 
25 
cases 1 to 5, the team's comparative advantage is revealed, and we would 
expect output mixes to move away from lower-priced foodgrain production. 
The results appearing in the third section of Table 3 support 
hypothesis 3 . Foodgrain production declines from a high of 185,626 
catties in case l to 138,042 catties in case 4. Interestingly, foodgrain 
production takes a slight turn upward in case 5 which can be explained in 
a single word--prices . 
In case 4, the team must meet contract obligations to the government 
meaning a significant portion of foodgrains are sold at procurement (or 
contrac t) prices. In case 5 , the quotas are lifted and the team is able 
to receive market prices for all its foodgrain output. Consequently, the 
team finds incentive to increase pr oduction , lending further evidence to 
the argument that one possible policy instrument for stimulating agricul-
tural production is higher producer prices. 
Predictably, as the team's foodgrain production declines, it is 
supplanted by production of more profitable agricultural commodities, 
namely vegetables and pigs, which are sold in local markets at market 
prices. Table 6 shows the percentage of total land area devoted to 
vegetable and pig production by households in each of the five cases. In 
Table 6 . Land area engaged in household pig and vegetable production 
Case l Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Land for pigs and 
vegetables 0 14 .34 43.02 90 .3 94.8 
Percent of total 0 5 15 31 33 
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cases l through 3, there are limits on how much land can be used for 
household production activities and the team uses this land to its upper 
limit . There are no limits on area allocated to private plot production 
in cases 4 and 5. However, in case 4 , the team must plant enough area in 
wheat, corn, and cotton to meet contract obligations and, in case S, 
foodgrain production becomes an economically lucrative activity due t o 
higher prices. 
Hypothesis 4: Increasing Income 
As the economic environment becomes more market oriented, we would 
expect the team ' s income to increase. This expectation rests partly on 
the reasoning presented in hypothesis 3 and partly on the following . 
Through policy changes from case 1 to case 5, the economic environment 
faced by the team becomes l ess restrictive and the team is allowed 
greater freedom to maximize its " profits" which are in fact distributed 
as the team's income. 
Our results support hypothesis 4 . As can be seen in Table 2, the 
team's adjusted income nearly doubles as conditions change from case l to 
case 5 . For a team of 38 households, this translates into an increase in 
average per capita income from ¥96.7 in case 1 to ¥178.8 in case 5 . 
If hypotheses 3 and 4 are considered together, an inverse relation-
ship between foodgrain production and income for this particular team 
becomes apparent. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5. This 
r elationship suggests that within the established price structure , there 
is a trade off between levels of foodgrain production and levels of 
Total foodgrain 
production 
(ca tties) 
185 , 626 
183 , 510 
170,261 
142 ,47 2 
138 , 042 
0 
27 
19,736 26 , 176 
23 ,265 30 , 579 
36,474 
Income 
(yuan) 
Figure 5 . The relationship between output and income levels 
income . The s t ate elicits the greates t foodgrain s upply response from 
the team in case l, but this is also where the team's income is the 
lowest. As the team is gran t ed greater freedom in its production 
decisions, it is able to augment its income , but not without sacrificing 
some foodgrain production. 
Within the existing price structure, then, it appears Chinese 
planners and policy makers must make a choice : Will higher levels of 
foodgrain production or higher levels of income be the principal 
objective of agricultural policy? 
Our analysis of this team further suggests one possible solution to 
this unhappy dilemma--higher producer prices. In case 5 , when the team 
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is allowed to receive market prices for its foodgrain, not only does 
income rise, so does the level of foodgrain output! Allowing for wage 
increases in the urban sector (currently anathema to Chinese planners) 
would facilitate such price changes and help to reduce the enormous 
government subsidies of both producer and consumer prices. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This analysis lends support to several observations regarding the 
Chinese agricultural economy. 
First, the results provide further evidence that farmers in 
developing countries do indeed r espond to economic incentives . It 
f urthe r justifies the use of microeconomic analysis - -in t his case , linear 
prograuunin~--to s tudy problems of agricultural policy in the People's 
Republic of China . 
Second , even in a labor sur plus economy, labor is not necessarily 
availa ble when and where it is needed . As is so often the case in other 
agrarian societies, there is marked seasonality of labor demand in China. 
Averaged over an entire year, there is a surplus of labor . But , during 
peak periods, there is a shortage which constrains the t eam ' s production 
po tential . A national policy permitting collectives to hire labor is an 
important first step in relieving this constraint . 1 
Finally, we have demonstrated that within the existing price 
structure, there is a trade off between levels of foodgrain production 
and levels of income. Such a price structure creates a conflict between 
nat i onal and local priorities because, under this structure , what is 
optimal f or the few (i.e . , the team) is not optimal for the many (i . e ., 
the nation) . Given the existing price structure, it is in the team ' s 
best interest to cut back foodgrain output in favor of mor e profitable 
1There are also issues of labor mobility to be addressed, but 
these lie beyond the authority of this analysis (see, for example, 
Johnson, 1982) . 
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hog and vegetable production . This , however, is not necessarily in the 
best interest of a country which has one billion people to feed . On the 
other hand, the suggested solution t o this dilemma--hieher producer 
prices for staple agricultural cornmodities--is likely to require further 
increases in already costly government subsidies unless urban wages are 
allowed to rise. Given this state of affairs, policy makers may continue 
to i gnore the market mechanism in favor of other policy instruments . 
The sort of analysis presented here could likewise be used to 
predict how a t eam might respond to economic objectives creat ed by 
policies elsewhere on the continuum of control in Figure 2 . With these 
responses understood, policies could be formulated to encourage the 
desired behavior f rom Chinese collectives under f uture national planning 
objec tives . 
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PART TWO 
THE EPFECT OF SHIFTING MARKET STRUCTURES ON A CHINESE 
COLLECTIVE'S OUTPUT SUPPLY AND INPUT DEMAND 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the People's Republic of China , unlike most Weste rn economies, 
the market is only one technique among several for directing the economic 
activitie s of firms and households . The centralized nature of the s tate 
has t ended to prejudice the Chinese in favor of various nonmarket 
controls until recently. Now , however, a major aspect of economic reform 
is the integration of state planning with the market mechanism. 
Zhou (1982, page 103) states that "the almost unanimous view of 
Chinese economists on the need to promote commodity economy and act by 
the law of value provides a theoretical basis for the policy of 
regul ating the economy through the market under the guidance of state 
planning . " This analysis takes this idea one step further by applying a 
microeconomic planning technique--linear programming--to issues of market 
supply and demand. 
In the first essay, linear programming was used to make a broad 
comparison of a team ' s optimal response to changing policy environments, 
holding all prices and resource levels cons tant. This second essay uses 
parametric programming to determine the effect of changing price and 
resource levels on the t eam's behavior, with the intent of accomplishing 
three objectives. 
First, I develop output s upply and input demand curves for a produc-
tion team (i . e. , collective) in China's nonmarket economy. Second, I use 
this technique to investigate the effects the Responsibility Sys tem has 
had upon the output supply and input demand of a typical agricultural 
33 
produc tion team in comparison to the most liberal of previous planning 
environments, 1961 to 1966. Finally, I predict the potential future 
effects upon team supply and demand of shifting from the structure of the 
Responsibility System to a full market economy . 
These objectives gave rise to the three hypotheses tested in this 
paper. By accomplishing the first objective , we can test whether: 
1. The Responsibility System has increased the supply potential of 
produc tion teams. 
2 . The Responsibility System has increased the demand for land and 
labor by production teams . 
3 . Ou tput supply and input demand relationships will further shift 
as the agricultural economy becomes more market oriented . 
We might expect a priori that the team's supply and demand curves 
would shift cleanly and consistently from one policy period to the next . 
This, however , does not take into account the interaction between 
variables affected by policy changes . For example , the policy periods 
included in this anlaysis are marked by significant changes in the team's 
ability to both hire and allocate labor. This labor factor may alter the 
shape of a supply or demand curve , or cause it to shift in an unexpec t ed 
direction, yielding results which are at once more interesting to the 
analyst, and more useful to the policy maker. 
Through an evaluat ion of the above three hypotheses, combined with 
this very important caveat, we hope to allow Chinese planners and pol i cy 
makers to more thoroughly study the effects of shifting market structures 
on output supply and input demand. 
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METHODOLOGY 
As a part of the larger Chinese economy , the production team must 
optimize an objective function based upon the socialist labor theory of 
value (Lardy, 1978) which provides us with the identity: 
P=C+V+M 
where P =value or price, 
C embodied (or past) labor, 
V =present labor, and 
M = Marxian surplus value . 
For the Chinese agricultural economy , this relationship may be further 
disagg regated: 
where P = price, 
C = nonlabor production costs, 
V = in- kind wages to labor, k 
V cash wages to labor 
c 
Mf = collective fund, and 
M = taxes. 
t 
Fr om the components of the socialist labor theory value we can 
formula t e objective functions to be optimized under the various economic 
policy environments imposed upon production teams since 1949. Objective 
funct ions f or hypothetical cases--such as a market economy--may also be 
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formulated from these components. In this analysis, we cons ider three 
policy environments: 1 
Period 1--the Five-Year Adjustment (1961-1966), 
Period 2--the Responsibility System (1981-present), and 
Period 3--hypothetical market economy . 
These particular policy periods were selected in order t o compare the 
current Responsibility System with the most liberal of previous planning 
environments (1961 to 1966), and to compare the impact of a market 
economy with both. 
We were able to construct linear programming models for these policy 
periods by representing the economic environment of each period with a 
distinct objective function and a unique set of constraints. 2 Once 
these mode ls were solved , we were able to determine relevant price and 
resource level ranges through range analysis. Parametric programming was 
then used to trace out the supply relationship for wheat and the demand 
relationships for both land and labor. 
A generalized version of the LP matrices used to solve the optimiza-
tion problems associated with the three policy periods is presented in 
Figure 1. 3 Modifications of the objective function and corresponding 
1For a description of the objective function associated with these 
periods, see the Theoretical Framework section of Part One. 
2rn Part One, we used a set of 1980 data from an agricultural 
production team in north China to develop and validate the initial linear 
programming model of the team's optimal economic behavior. 
3Because no comparable time series or cross-sectional data are 
available, we we re not able t o estimate production functions . By 
implication, the t eam is limited to producing with a single technology. 
Produce Sell Buy Consume Taxes Fund Borrow Hire Plots RRS 
C row (economic) -c. 
J cj -cJ -cj -cj -cJ -cj cJ 
Land 1 l Bi 
Labor aij - 1 aij Bi 
Bullocks aij B. 1 
Capital a .. 
1J 
-1 aij aij Bi 
Quotas/contracts l Bi 
Subsistence 1 1 Bi 
Transfer rows - aij 1 0 
Collective accounting -aij aij -aij -aij -1 - a ij aij 0 w 
()'\ 
Taxes l Bi 
Hiring I aij Bi 
Plot transfer l Bi 
Figure l . Generalized programming model for a north China production team 
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LP matrix for each policy period are briefly described in the paragraphs 
that follow. 
Period 1 : The Five-Yea r Adjustment (1961-1966) 
Policies of this period were marked by centralized government 
control. The state dictated to the t eam that it must produce ce rtain 
crops--wheat, corn, and cotton--sell minimum quotas to the government at 
procuremen t prices, and meet its own subsistence needs. Market prices 
barely influenced the amount of marketed surplus because quotas were set 
so high that few teams had any surplus to market (Perkins, 1966). 
During the adjustment, the state allowed up t o five percent of 
collective land a r ea to be allocated to household plots. In terms of the 
LP matrix, this meant not more than 14 of the total 286 . 8 mou could be 
allocated to household plots . Additionally, there was no capital 
borrowing and no labor hiring during this period . 
Period 2: The Responsibility System (1981 -Present) 
We r epresent this period with a form of the Responsibility System 
known as "group contract s" (lian chan dao zu). Under this arrangeme nt, 
the t e am divides it s fields into strips and groups contract to meet fixed 
produc tion quotas. In effect, this allows the constraint on household 
plots to increase to the full collective land area or 286.8 mou. 
However , since contract obligations must be met, the quota restrictions 
remain in place and in this way limit the extent of household plot 
cultivation. 
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Through the Responsibility System, the state is able to direct a 
significant portion of foodgrain output by enforcing contracts. Aside 
from this, however, inputs and ouptuts may be "freely" exchanged . Other 
policies associated with the Responsibility System allow us to eliminate 
the collective fund, include capital borrowing , and bring labor hiring 
into the LP matrix. 
Period 3: Hypothetical Market Economy 
This case postulates the i ntroduction of a market economy into 
present-day agricultural organization and might best be compared with 
cooperative forms of agricultural organization practiced in Taiwan. In 
terms of the LP matrix, the collective fund is eliminated, all quota 
restrictions are removed, and the entire 286.8 mou of land area is free 
to be allocated to household plots. 
A summary of the key distinctions between the three policy periods 
is presented in Figure 2. 
Period l 
Period 2 
Period 3 
Quotas/ Subsistence 
contracts requirement Labor hiring Plot area 
Quotas Produce 0 5% maximum 
Produce or 
Contracts buy 6 people 15% maximum 
Produce or 
0 buy Uncons trained 100% maximum 
Figure 2. Key distinctions between the LP matrices for 
periods l through 3 
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Parametric Prog ramming 
Initially, the LP models for the three policy periods were solved 
1 
for fixed prices and resource levels. Then, through the use of 
parame tric programming, we were able to trace out stepped supply curves 
for wheat and demand curves for land and labor. Parametric programming 
is a technique which allows us to change a price (C r ow) or a resource 
level by constant increments, ceteris paribus, causing the relationships 
thus traced to be stepped . 
To determine the rele vant increments of 1) price change in the case 
of wheat and 2) resource l evel change in the case of land and labor, 
r ange analysis was used. Range analysis is a t echnique which reveals , 
for a single LP solution, the range over which a shadow price or 
opportunity cost is valid . Actual output from one range analysis is 
presented in Fi g ure 3 to illustrate . This example indicates that a 
Row Activity Lower limit Lower activity Uni t cos t 
Upper limit Upper activity Unit cost 
Labor (early June) 1,414 none 1,360 . 47 . 8996 -
1,415 1, 510.47 . 8996 
Figure 3 . Range analys is for early June labor 
under the Responsibility System 
1The reader may refer to Par t One for details regarding changes in 
output mix , resource use , and income levels . 
40 
shadow price (unit cost) of ¥0.90 per hour is relevant over a range of 
1,360 to 1,510 labor unit hours per ten-day period . Based upon this 
information, the RHS for labor was initialized at a level of 500 labor 
unit hours and increased by increments of 100 until it reached a level of 
2,000 unit hours . Using this procedure, we were able t o find the shadow 
price associated with changing levels of labor availability, the shadow 
price being a measure of how much one additional unit of labor would be 
worth to the team. 
Put another way, the parametric procedure reveals the value of the 
marginal product (VMP) of labor at different levels of labor 
availability, making it possible to trace out a stepped VMP--or demand--
curve for labor in a particular ten-day period. This was done for early 
June labor in all three periods . Parametric programming was likewise 
used to examine the value of the marginal product of land in each 
period . 
Supply curves for whea t were similarly derived. In the case of 
wheat output, price levels were parame terized and the LP was solved to 
determine how wheat supply would respond to such price changes. The 
results were then used to plot stepped supply curves for wheat in each of 
the three policy periods . 
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RESlTLTS 
Hypothesis 1: Supply Potential for Wheat 
Here, we examine the effect the Responsibility System has had on the 
team ' s supply potential for wheat by comparing supply relationships for 
period 1 to those for pe r iod 2. Figure 4 illustrates the market supply 
curve of wheat over and above 1) procurement quotas in the case of 
period 1 and 2) contract obligations in the case of period 2. 1 
The supply r elationships in Figure 4 provide only faint support for 
our first hypothesis: That the Responsibility System has expanded the 
supply potential of produc tion teams. Overall, the supply curve shifts 
outward, but only slightly. Thus, over the price range shown, the team 
would in total s upply only 4 .8 percent more wheat to the market under the 
Responsibility Sys tem than unde r the policies of the Five-Year 
Adjustment . 
Significantly, there is a price range (¥0 . 26 to ¥0.42) over 
which the team's marketed wheat supply actually contracts under the 
Responsibility System. We suspect this occurs because labor hiring is 
allowed under the Responsibility System, relieving a constraint upon 
production of more labor-intensive crops--such as corn--relative t o 
wheat . Consequently, the opportunity cost of producing wheat is higher 
1Marketed output should not be confused with produced output 
which, in the case of wheat, actually declines from period l to period 2 
(see Table 2, Part One). 
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than it was under the labor constraint of period 1. 1 Corn thereby 
competes with wheat up to the point where the market price for wheat 
(¥0 . 42) overshadows the increased opportunity cos t associated with corn 
ln period 2. 
These s upply curves also reveal impor tant information for price 
planning. For example , under the policies of the Five Year Adjustment, 
prices above ¥0. 26 were met with virtually no increase in this team's 
marketed wheat supply of about 52 , 000 catties . But, under the 
Responsibility System, a price increase from ¥0.25 to ¥0 . 30 causes 
marketed s upply t o jump from 34,500 catties to 50,000 catties. For any 
further increase to occur , price must be raised to ¥0.42 per catty. 
Hypothesis 2: Demand for Land and Labor 
By once again comparing parametrics fo r periods l and 2, we were 
able to investigate the effects of the Responsibility System on the 
team's demand for land and labor. The results are presented in Figures 5 
and 6 . 
The d~mand relationship for land in Figure 5 may be interpreted as 
follows : Say the team has 210 mou of land available for cultivation . 
Under the Five-Year Adjustment, the shadow price--or VMP--of the last mou 
would be ¥71 . Under the Responsibility System, the shadow price of the 
last mou would be ¥147 . Thus, in the economic environment created by 
the Responsibility System, the value of the marginal product of land is 
1Under the linear pr ogram.ming algorithm, the supply curve is 
actually a graph of the z-row, or the opportunity cost of not producing 
the optimal level of a crop. 
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doubled at 210 mou. For other levels of land use the VMP curve also 
shifts , but not by such a dramatic magnitude. This pattern can be 
attributed to the grea t er freedom of choice the Responsibi lity System 
g i ves the team in deciding what to produce and how to produce it . As we 
would expec t, the team alters its patterns of production and re source 
utilization such that t he value of land is augmented . Our results, which 
show the VMP of land increasing from period 1 to period 2, provide 
support for the hypothesis that input demand has expanded under the 
Responsibility System. 
The demand relationships for labor presented in Figure 6 are 
interesting because they demonstrate the opposi t e pat t ern . Instead of 
shifting outward, the VMP curve for labor shif ts inward under the 
Responsibility Sys t em . In other words, at a given level of labor 
availability, the value of the last unit of collective labor falls f r om 
period 1 to period 2. Alternatively, a t a given implicit wage, the 
quantity of labor demanded falls . This can be explained by the t eam ' s 
ability in period 2 to hire labor at c rit ical times , such as the first 
ten days of June . (Contrast this with the land resource, whic h is fixed; 
the team cannot "hire" additional land.) 
Where labor hiring is not permitted, as in period 1, the value of an 
additional hour of l abor during a critical t en days is well above the 
going wage of ¥ 0 . 865/hour . 1 In pe r iod 2, however, the team employs 
labor to the point where the wage paid to labor (price) equals the value 
1This was also demonstrated in Part One . See, for i nstance , 
Table 4 on page 23. 
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of its marginal contribution (shadow price ). 1 More succinctly, labor 
hi.ring policies of the Responsibility System allow the team to operate 
efficiently, and reduce the VMP of--or demand for--the team 's own labor . 
Hypothesis 3: Supply and Demand Effects of a Market Economy 
Here, we compare the effects of a market economy on supply and 
demand relationships to those of the Five-Year Adjustment and the 
Responsibility Sys t em . In Figures 7, 8, and 9, the results for period 3 
are superimposed on those already pre sented for periods 1 and 2 . For the 
most part, our hypothesis that supply and demand relationships will 
further shift as the economy becomes more marke t oriented is supported . 
In the case of wheat supply (Figure 7), the trend toward increased 
output is continued and more pronounced. The team's market supply curve 
for wheat shifts significantly outward in a market environment, and there 
is no stage of reversed opportunity costs as seen between periods 1 and 
2 . In total, marketed output increases 23 percent over period 1, and 
17 . 4 percent over period 2, supporting our expectation that a market 
economy would fur ther expand the team's supply potential. 
Figure 7 also reveals that under the policies of the Five Year 
Adjustment and the Responsibility System, there is a limit (of about 
56,000 catties) beyond which higher market prices do not stimulate 
additional marketed output. Contrast this to the situation under a 
market economy, where a price as low as ¥0.25 per catty produces a 
supply response of 70,000 catties . Such resul ts suggest that for this 
1 Again, the reader may refer to Table 4 on page 23. 
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team, increased wheat production may be brought about by a liberalization 
of policies, rather than higher prices. 
The effect of a market economy on the team's demand for land is seen 
in Figure 81 where we notice that the VMP curve shifts inward f r om 
period 2 to period 3. This interesting result is related to several 
policy variables. 
In period 1, where there is no labor hiring, the marginal value of 
labor is high relative to land. When labor hiring is allowed, land 
becomes a more binding constraint, and the relative value of land 
increases as reflected by the outward movement of the VMP curve in 
period 2 . Moreover, the environment of the Responsibility System--where 
the team is simultaneously fulfilling government contracts and trying to 
engage in profitable private plot production--puts pressure on land that 
further inflates the VMP curve. 
Under the market economy of period 3, however, some of this pressure 
is relieved. In the absence of contract obligations to the state, and 
given the ability to hire more outside labor, the team has decided upon 
an output mix that is less land--and more labor--intensive, causing the 
demand (VMP) curve for land in period 3 to shift downward slightly. Such 
results demonstrate that a team's demand for inputs is influenced by the 
interaction among many policy variables. 
1The team was limited to a maximum of 286.8 mou in periods 1 and 
2 , which is consistent with China ' s policies prohibiting the exchange of 
land. In period 3, the portion of the VMP curve for land that extends 
beyond the 286.8 mou limit simply reflects the fact that our parametric 
model for a market economy allowed the team to acquire additional land. 
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Finally, in Figure 9, the effect of a market economy on the team's 
demand for labor is illustrated. From Figure 9 can be discerned three 
characteristics of downward-shifting labor demand in period 3. 
First, the team can hire more outside labor because the 1,500 hour 
limit does not exist in a pure market environment. Thus, at levels above 
1,500 hours, the VMP curve for labor extends beyond the curves for the 
other two periods. 
Second, the team does hire more outside labor due to the more labor 
intensive nature of the crops--such as plot vegetables--it is now free to 
produce. Such hiring lowers the VMP of labor, as was seen earlier. 
Third, team labor itself is more motivated in a market environment, 
which increases the effective labor supply and decreases the value of the 
last hour. 
The combination of these three factors causes the team's demand for 
labor to shift downward and extend outward as it does in period 3. Once 
again, such results demonstrate the significant influence of interaction 
among policy variables upon the team's demand for inputs. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This analysis has taken the idea of regulating the economy through 
the market under the guidance of state planning one step further by using 
a microeconomic planning technique--LP--to study the effect of shifting 
market structures. Our parametric programm.ing model, formulated from the 
labor theory of value, has proven useful to this end in three respects. 
First, for a given set of economic policy objectives, parametrics 
can be used to predict an individual team's market response to changing 
co1U1Dodity prices and varying levels of resource availability (ceteris 
paribus). Moreover, the examples presented in this particular study--
wheat supply, VMP of land, and VMP of labor--are by no means exhaustive. 
Other output supply and input demand r e lationships could also be 
examined. 
Second, by generating sets of parametrics, as this study bas done, 
it is possible to compare market supply and demand relationships of an 
individual team under changing economic policy objectives. With such 
information, planners may be better able to predict the effects of 
various policies on the economic behavior of teams. Will the team supply 
more or less wheat to the market? Will the demand for labor rise or 
fall? And what about the market value of land? Will it be enhanced or 
diminished? 
A final feature of this analysis is although it cannot predict every 
aspect of a team's behavior, it can be carried out within the framework 
of China's existing statistical systems. By combining internally 
54 
available data with the methodology outlined here, Chinese planners can 
more thoroughly study the market effects of policy alternatives and 
policy makers can more thoroughly understand market effects before making 
their next policy decision. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
These two essays are examples of how linear programming can be used 
to study the optimal economic behavior of Chinese agricultural production 
teams under changing policy environments. 
The first essay, "The Optimal Response of a Chinese Agricultural 
Collective to Alternative Economic Policy Environments," examined the 
microeconomic impact of five policy environments on a typical collec-
tive' s resource allocation, production, and income. Through the 
evaluation of four specific hypotheses, we were able to make several 
observations regarding the Chinese agricultural economy. Our results 
suggested that : 
1. The collective does respond to economic incentives . 
2. Labor hiring is necessary for the team to overcome seasonal 
labor shortages which can act to constrain the team's overall produc-
tion. 
3. There is a trade off between levels of foodgrain production and 
income under the existing price structure, creating a conflict between 
local and national priorities. 
In the second essay, we took the idea of regulating the Chinese 
economy through the market under the guidanee of state planning one step 
further by using linear programming (a microeconomic planning technique) 
to study the effect of shifting market structures on a team's output 
supply and input demand. We demonstrated how parametric programming--an 
extension of LP--can be used to predict a team's market response to 
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changing commodity prices and varying levels of resource availability. 
We also generated sets of parametrics to compare market s upply and demand 
relationships of an individual team under changing economic policy 
objectives. 
The sort of analyses presented in these two essays could be used by 
Chinese planners to predict how a team might respond to the economic 
objectives created by various policies along the continuum of control 
developed in Part One (see Figure 2) . And. although this analysis cannot 
predict every aspect of a team ' s behavior. i t can be carried out within 
the framework of China's existing statistical systems. By combining 
internally available data with the methodologies offered here. Chinese 
planners may more thoroughly study the effects of policy alternatives and 
policies may be formulated to encourage the desired behavior from 
collectives under future national planning objectives. 
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